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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN KUHNHAUSEN, PETITION FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE UTAH STATE BAR Petitioner. 
Case No. 15692 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, after formal hearing, 
refused to certify to this Court that the petitioner was an individual of good 
~oral character. Petitioner is requesting that this Court review the evidence 
presented at hearing and exercise its inherent power in matters dealing with the 
courts of this State and order his admission to the Utah State Bar. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the 29th of April, 1977, petitioner Steven Kuhnhausen filed his formal 
application for admission to the Utah State Bar. In July of 1977, the petitioner 
was required to appear before the Character and Fitness Screening Committee of the 
Bar. At that meeting, Mr. Kuhnhausen was asked to explain the circumstances of 
his arrest in 1976. Mr. Kuhnhausen informed the Committee that the arrest had been 
expunged by court order and it was his understanding of the law that the effect of 
such an expungement was to permit him to answer all questions regarding the incident 
as though it had never occurred, or to refrain from answering such inquiries at 
al~. The Committee members acknowledged the existence of the expungement order, 
hut persisted in questioning the petitioner about the underlying events. Mr. 
Kuhnhausen refused to answer any questions regarding that matter. 
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The Committee subsequently declined to recommend that Mr. Kuhnhauser 
be permitted to sit for the Utah State Bar Examination. The petitioner requ, 
a formal hearing on his character and fitness, and asked leave to sit for the 
examination pending the determination reached at that hearing. This request, 
granted, and Mr. Kuhnhausen was informed in September of 1977 that he had sur 
fully passed the examination. 
On October 21, 1977, a hearing was held on the subject of the petiti 
fitness, with Commissioner W. Eugene Hansen presiding. The petitioner testii 
his own behalf and offered the testimony of three members of the Bar with whr 
had become acquainted while working as a legal intern with Utah Legal Servict 
All three expressed the opinion that Mr. Kuhnhausen was possessed of superior, 
abilities and had the high moral qualities necessary to the practice of law, ' 
only evidence offered by the Bar on the subject of the petitioner's moral fit 
embodied in a stipulation agreed to by respective counsel that a Mr. Hedberg, 
called, would testify that in June of 1976 he was in the apartment of the per 
and on that occasion he observed certain controlled substances in the apartmE 
This stipulation was agreed to after the hearing officer had denied Mr. Kuhnt 
motion to exclude such evidence as being violative of his rights under Utah's 
pungement statute and the court ordered decree of expungement. 
On January 6, 1978, the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar 
entered their findings and conclusions, refusing to certify Mr. Kuhnhausen fc 
membership in the Utah State Bar. 
The petitioner is now requesting this Court to review the action ti 
by the Commission and to admit him to the practice of law in the State of Ut: 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
Jl POINT I. THE REFUSAL OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TO CERTIFY THE PETITIONER 
he WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER AND 
t, STATUTORY LAW, ~~ ITS ADMISSION RESULTED IN A DENIAL TO THE PETI-
Ut TIGNER OF A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1977), provides, in part, that following 
ti a petition for expungement: 
ii If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for 
relief under this subsection, it shall issue its order 
hr granting the relief prayed for and further directing 
the law enforcement agency making the initial arrest to 
ct retrieve any record of that arrest which may have been 
forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Identification. There-
or, after, the arrest, detention, and any further proceedings 
in that case shall be deemed not to have occurred, and a 
petitioner may answer accordingly any question relating 
to their existence. 
it 
'er 
. IDE 
ml 
t's 
lar 
fc 
In the instant case, the petitioner requested such relief, and pursuant to 
this statute, orders of expungement were duly issued by both the Salt Lake City 
and Third District Courts prior to the date Mr. Kuhnhausen applied for the Bar . 
The Bar, however, became advised of the petitioner's arrest record and, with full 
knowledge of the orders of expungement, obtained copies of Mr. Kuhnhausen's arrest 
records and court proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5(4) (Supp. 1977), clearly provides under what 
circumstances access to expunged records is to be permitted: 
Inspection of the records shall thereafter be permitted 
by the Court only upon petition by the person who is 
the subject of those records and only to the persons 
named in that petition. 
Xr. Kuhnhausen never filed such a petition, on behalf of the Utah State 
Bar or anyone else. The statute does not provide for dissemination of the expunged 
records without such a petition, and whether such occurs by mistake, negligence or 
intentional disobedience to court order, unlawful release of the information con-
tained in those records should not be allowed to vitiate the protection granted 
-3-
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elsewhere in the statute and subject an individual whose record has been expun, 
inquiry from which he would otherwise be immune. 
There can be no doubt that the Legislature was fully aware of the brc. 
rights it was creating by passage of the expungement statute, and that they fu:· 
intended to insure that individuals who qualified for the protection of the ac: 
would no longer be penalized and stigmatized by prior arrest records. The Bar 
however, acted in open defiance of this legislative intention by obtaining the 
petitioner's arrest record and then offering evidence of the arresting officer' 
observations at the time of arrest. This testimony being the only evidence up· 
which the Bar based its refusal to certify Mr. Kuhnhausen, the petitioner respc· 
fully submits that this Court should indorse the laudable intent of the legist: 
and refuse to penalize the petitioner for an arrest which has been judicially, 
punged, and which by statute is "deemed not to have occurred." 
POINT II. THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIO 
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT HEARING. 
It is beyond question that when reviewing recommendations of the Boarc 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, this Court is not bound by the findings~ 
conclusions of the Commissioners, but retains the ultimate authority to revievl 
facts and make an independent determination. This power stems from the Court', 
inherent authority to control admission to the practice of law and discipline 
those admitted. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943); !\0 
v. Burton, 64 Utah 562, 232 P. 914 (1924). 
Past decisions of this Court have recognized that while the recommend. 
of the Commission should be accorded due consideration, they will not be adopt· 
"unless supported by substantial evidence," In Re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217' 
_;,_ 
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P. 2d 631, 633 (1960), and will always be disregarded if they 
appear to have been made arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. 
In Re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273 (1972). In Re Johnston, 
524 P.2d 593 (Utah 1974). 
The petitioner respectfully submits that the Commission's 
conclusion that he "did not establish that he is possessed of good 
moral character and entitled to the high regard and confidence of 
the public" is not supported by any substantial evidence in the 
record, and that the Commission's refusal to certify him for ad-
mission to the Bar was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The petitioner is fully aware and acknowledges that an 
applicant for admission to membership in the Bar bears the burden 
of establishing his fitness. However, as has been noted by the 
Supreme Courts of other jurisdictions, once the applicant presents 
prima facie evidence of his good character it is the obligation of 
the party opposing his admission to come forward and rebut that 
evidence, with any reasonable doubt encountered being resolved in 
favor of the applicant. 
In Hallinin v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 421 P.2d 76 
(Cal. 1966), the California Supreme Court noted that: 
In disciplinary proceedings this court examines and 
weighs the evidence and passes upon its sufficiency. 
Any reasonable doubts encountered should be resolved in 
favor of the accused. These rules are equally appli-
cable to admission proceedings. Ii· at 80 (citations 
omitted) 
In Greene v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 4 Cal. 3d 189, 
480 P.2d 976 (1971), the Court again expressly held that reasonable 
doubts as to the good character of an applicant must be resolved 
in the applicant's favor after he has established a prima facie 
-5-
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showing of good character. For examples of other jurisdictions 
employing this same standard, see Coleman v. Watts, 81 So.2d 6i 
(Fla. 1955); Petition of Waters, 447 P.2d 661 (Nev. 1968). 
In the instant matter, it is apparent that the Commis 
applied a much different standard to Mr. Kuhnhausen. Conclusio: 
number six (6) of the Commission states that the applicant "did 
remove any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness." 
obvious implication being that the applicant was not only given. 
the burden of proof, but was subjected to a presumption of unfi: 
which could only be overcome with evidence sufficient to remove 
"all suspicion." 
The imposition of such a burden, to clear himself of 
and all suspicion, is patently arbitrary and unreasonable. As 
court stated in March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 433 P.2d ).: 
(Cal. 1967): 
the fundamental question to be determined is the sue 
whether the matter at issue relates to an applicant 
for admission or an attorney upon whom discipline has 
been imposed: is the petitioner a fit and proper per 
to be permitted to practice law, and the answer to tc .. 
usually turns upon whether he has committed or is lii-
to continue to commit aets of moral turpitude. 
~· at 193 
The purpose of attorney discipline or refusal to adm'' 
applicants to practice is, as this Court has acknowledged, to 
the public from unscrupulous practitioners, and not to impose 
penalty upon the attorney or candidate. In Re Badger, supra. 
an applicant for admission is forced to dispel all suspicion 
Commission may indulge in with regard to his fitness, and a fc. 
to meet this subjective requirement results in denial of the :. 
-6-
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practice his chosen profession, many applicants might find them-
selves penalized for conduct--or even suspected conduct--which 
in no way bears upon their ability to render able and honest 
service to the public. Such a formula for admission or denial 
of the right to follow one's chosen profession is wholly 
inconsistent with any notion of due process. 
In cases involving attorney discipline, this Court has 
held that "charges should be clearly sustained by convincing 
proof and a fair preponderance of the evidence." In Re Hanson, 
158 P. 778, 779 (Utah 1916). Further, the charges so proved 
must show the attorney engaged in acts of moral turpitude which 
reflect upon his ability or willingness to deal with the public 
honestly and with a high degree of integrity and fidelity. 
In Re Platz, 42 U. 439, 132 P. 390 (1913). 
As has been demonstrated above, once an applicant 
makes a prima facie showing of his good character, the same 
standard should be applied in determining if the evidence regarding 
his actions "clearly sustains by convincing proof" that he 
is guilty of conduct which is inconsistent with his professional 
duty; that is, acts of moral turpitude. 
This Court addressed itself to the question of what 
constitutes moral turpitude in In Re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969 
(1943), wherein it was acknowledged that 
moral turpitude is adaptive; it is determined 
by the state of public morals and the common 
sense of the community. Moral turpitude is 
an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in 
the private and social duties which a man 
owes to his fellow men or to society in 
general, contrary to the accepted and customary 
rule of right and duty between man and man. 136 
P.2d at 792. (citations omitted) 
-7-
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It is noteworthy that in addressing itself to the 
question of whether possession of marijuana was an act 
involving moral turpitude, the California Supreme Court 
applied those tests enumerated above to conclude that it 
was not. 
held that: 
In In Re Higbie, 493 P.Zd 97 (Cal. 1972), the court 
Possession or use of mar~Juana is, of course, 
unlawful, but measured by the morals of the 
day its possession or use does not constitute 
"an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity 
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of 
right and duty between man and man," or indicate 
that an attorney is unable to meet the professional 
and fiduciary duties of his practice. Id at 103 
(citations omitted) 
The record in this matter is devoid of any showing 
that the petitioner lacks the integrity, fidelity or honesty 
necessary to the practice of law. Indeed, quite the contrary 
is true as individuals acquainted with Mr. Kuhnhausen both in 
professional and social roles testified that he was possessed 
of those attributes and a high degree of legal competence as 
well. The Commission disregarded this testimony, and based 
upon an inference entirely extrinsic to the record, concluded 
that the petitioner had possessed controlled substances with 
the intent to distribute them. Bar counsel never questioned 
the petitioner regarding his alleged possession of controlled 
substances, and there was absolutely no testimony of any kind 
suggesting any intent to distribute controlled substances. 
In addition, there is a complete absence in the recc· 
of any suggestion that the conduct which the Bar suspected the 
petitioner to have engaged in in any way limited ~r. Kuhnhausi 
ability or desire to offer effective and trustworthy legal 
counsel to the public. ~r. Kuhnhausen stated affirmatively 
-8-
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his willingness to take the attorney's oath and to abide by its 
tenants and those of the Canons of Ethics. Despite this 
assertion and the supporting testimony regarding the petitioner's 
moral fitness, the Commission relied upon a "suspicion" of 
unfitness to refuse to certify Mr. Kuhnhausen to become a member 
of the profession for which he had diligently prepared and for 
which he had already demonstrated his academic competence. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has noted that admission to 
the practice of law is not a matter of grace and favor, but is 
a right afforded to all who possess the necessary qualifications. 
Petition of Schaengold, 422 P.2d 686 (1967). The petitioner 
submits that the denial of this right cannot be premised upon a 
suspicion of the Commissioners unsupported by any evidence 
in the record and which can only be rebutted by evidence meeting 
a standard of proof known to none save those who pass judgment. 
The petitioner respectfully submits that the record 
developed at his hearing justifies his admission to the profession 
and asks this Court to not adopt the findings and conclusions 
of the Commisison, but rather, to rule favorably on his present 
petition and order the entry of his name upon the rolls of those 
admitted to the practice of law in this state. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of an arrest which was judicially ex-
punged prior to Mr. Kuhnhausen's application for admission to 
the Bar, the petitioner was questioned regarding his moral 
fitness to become an attorney. The petitioner relied upon the 
word of the law and declined to answer questions regarding his 
arrest. The Bar was dissatisfied with this silence, and contrary 
-9-
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to the intent of the expungment statute obtained evidence 
that the applicant had once possessed controlled substances. 
A hearing was then held where witnesses testified to Mr. Kuhn· 
hausen' s moral fitness and the petitioner himself affirmative: 
pledged to abide by the oath of the profession and its Canons 
of Ethics. The Commission was still not satisfied, having 
a suspicion about the petitioner's moral fitness--a suspicion 
I 
based entirely upon a single arrest, in which the charges were, 
ultimately dismissed, and the petitioner's assertion of his 
rights under the law to consider the arrest legally deemed no: 
to have taken place. 
The petitioner respectfully submits that the Commiso.l 
action in refusing to honor his right under the order of exp~ 
ment, and in drawing a negative inference from the assertion .. 
that right, was arbitrary and unreasonable. The petitioner 
further submits that the record developed at his hearing shows 
him to be an individual of high moral character, and the 
Commission's conclusion not to certify him on the basis of 
suspicion of unfitness is totally inconsistent with its 
duty to abide by the law and render impartial judgments on thi 
basis of the evidence offered, with any reasonable doubts 
being resolved in favor of the applicant. 
The petitioner therefore requests this Court for an 
order granting him admission to the Utah State Bar. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1978. 
~~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
-10-
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